An Approach to Certification Issues in Multi-State Diversity Class Actions in Federal Court After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by Kershell, Holly
An Approach to Certification Issues in
Multi-State Diversity Class Actions in
Federal Court After the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005
By HOLLY KERSHELL*
As CONGRESS RECOGNIZES, class actions afford a valuable mecha-
nism to plaintiffs with small claims by providing them access to the
courts when their injuries are not sizable enough to make pursuing
individual claims economically feasible.1 In addition to enabling indi-
viduals who suffer the same harm to seek redress for their injuries,2
class actions provide defendants with an end to litigation through the
finality of res judicata.3 Since Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,4 how-
ever, federal courts routinely deny certification of multi-state class ac-
tions grounded on state law claims, claiming the application of
multiple states' laws defeats the predominance and/or the managea-
bility requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3). 5 In
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1. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4, 83 (2005).
2. Id. at 4.
3. The resjudicata doctrine is a preclusion mechanism that achieves finality ofjudg-
ments by positing that once a case generates a judgment, parties to the action are pre-
cluded from further litigating any claim that they could have brought in the case
generating judgment. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 2002).
4. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). For examples of federal courts denying certification post-
Amchem, see In reBridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that class action is never proper when the laws of multiple states
must be applied); Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying
certification of nationwide class because the laws of multiple states would have to be ap-
plied); In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying certifica-
tion of a nationwide class action because the district judge failed to consider how the law of
negligence differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
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response to federal courts' hostility towards multi-state diversity class
actions, plaintiffs have typically sought class certification in state
courts where class actions have a higher likelihood of being certified. 6
The Class Action Fairness Act of 20057 ("CAFA") arose in part to
address a number of abuses occurring at the state level in the class
action system. Specifically, some state courtjudges were failing to con-
sistently apply the rules governing class actions and were not provid-
ing adequate supervision of litigation procedures and settlements.8 To
solve these problems, CAFA provided for original jurisdiction and re-
moval of class actions to federal court at the request of either party in
cases involving minimal diversity.9 The effect of CAFA will most likely
be that multi-state class actions that had previously been heard in state
court will be removed to and quickly dismissed in federal court leav-
ing many claimants with no place to seekjustice; that is, unless federal
courts change their methods for handling multi-state diversity class
actions.
Multi-state class actions can be made manageable if federal courts
are willing to undertake the proper, albeit complex, analysis of the
laws of multiple states; and, in this post-CAFA era, it is imperative that
they do so. Since federal courts are the primary forum in which multi-
state class actions may now be brought, it is vital that they stop summa-
rily denying certification of class actions involving the laws of multiple
states and assert themselves in their proper role as overseers of inter-
state cases of undeniable national importance. Undoubtedly, the
"quagmire" of choice-of-law issues involved in a multi-state diversity
action may be "extremely unsettling" when viewed at the outset of the
litigation.10 Nevertheless, if federal courts are willing to conduct the
proper analysis they will discover that "the problem is not nearly so
6. Joel S. Feldman, Class Certification Issues for Non-Federal Question Class Actions-De-
fense Perspective, in PRACTICING LAw INST., CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROSECUTION AND DE-
FENSE STRATEGIES POsT-CAFA 2005, at 221, 231 (2005) ("Given federal court hostility to
certification of non-federal question class actions, plaintiffs have proceeded to file a larger
percentage of these putative class claims in state court.").
7. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Most significantly, CAFA amends both federal diversity jurisdiction requirements
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and federal removal requirements codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. See id. § 4.
8. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005).
9. Id. at 28-29.
10. Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G. Bough, Conflict of Laws and Multi-State Class Ac-
tions: How Variations in State Law Affect the Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), 68
UMKC L. REv. 1, 1 (1999).
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complex."'11 Furthermore, there are tools available to federal courts to
help manage even the most complex litigation.' 2
Part I of this Comment enumerates the changes embodied in
CAFA and explains the effect that these provisions will have on class
actions. Part II discusses the trend among federal courts to deny certi-
fication of multi-state diversity class actions on the ground that appli-
cation of the law of multiple states is unmanageable and therefore
fails to satisfy Rule 23(b) (3)'s predominance requirement. Part III
predicts consequences likely to result if federal courts continue to
deny certification of manageable multi-state diversity class actions af-
ter CAFA. Part IV examines In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation13  ("Bridgestone/Firestond') in order to
demonstrate the manageability of multi-state diversity class actions by
outlining the requisite analyses and briefly describing some of the
tools available to assist with management before and during trial.
I. Under CAFA, Most Multi-State Diversity Class Actions Will
Be Removed to Federal Court Where a Federal Judge
Will Be Charged with the Certification Decision
CAFA creates new federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity
and eliminates most restrictions on removal. Whether originally filed
in or removed to federal court, these actions will be consolidated
through the Multidistrict Litigation procedure ("MDL"), under 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a) and placed before a single federal judge at least for
the purposes of pretrial proceedings.1 4 Due to most states' choice-of-
law rules, the judge may have no option but to apply the substantive
law of each class members' state of residence.
A. Prior to CAFA, Most Multi-State Class Actions Grounded in
State Law Were Heard in State Courts
The stringent diversity1 5 and amount-in-controversy 6 require-
ments for federal jurisdiction were responsible for keeping these class
11. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa.), affd sub nom. In re Sch.
Asbestos Ltig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (certifying a multi-state class action involving
the laws of multiple states).
12. See generally Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv.
547, 581-89 (1996).
13. 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
15. Before CAFA, complete diversity was required for a class action to be filed in or
removed to federal court. Complete diversity exists when no named class representative is a
citizen of the same state as any defendant. After CAFA only minimal diversity is required,
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actions in state courts. Yet the class action device experienced serious
abuse in state court, 17 such as "irrational federalism,"1 8 reverse auc-
tions,19 judicial "terror" on defendants, 20 and the lack of judicial re-
view of settlements. 21 These abuses led Congress to reform the
requirements for federal jurisdiction through CAFA.22
B. CAFA Substantially Expands Federal Jurisdiction to Encompass
Most Multi-State Class Actions
CAFA removes the complete diversity requirement and the rule
against aggregating claims to satisfy the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement. 23 Specifically, CAFA expands federal jurisdiction to en-
compass class actions that meet the following four requirements: (1)
the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; (2) the
plaintiff class includes 100 or more members; (3) the primary defend-
which exists when at least one member of a plaintiff class is a citizen of a different state
from any one defendant. See James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy:
Federalization of the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 391, 407 (2004); S. REP. No. 109-
14, at 10 (2005) (describing how the complete diversity requirement allowed plaintiffs'
lawyers who prefer to litigate in state courts to easily "game the system" and avoid removal
of large interstate class actions to federal court).
16. Prior to CAFA, the amount-in-controversy requirement mandated that the claims
of each class member exceed $75,000 without aggregation. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a); see also S.
REP. No. 109-14, at 10-11; Underwood, supra note 15, at 407. Note that Exxon v. Allapattah,
125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), held that under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, if one plaintiff or representative plaintiff satisfied the amount in controversy, other
plaintiffs or class members with lesser claims could join in the action. Id. at 2614.
17. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14, 20-21, 22-27.
18. See Underwood, supra note 15, at 405-06. "Irrational federalism" refers to the
practice of locally elected state court judges applying local law to claims against nonresi-
dent businesses, thus affecting business practices beyond their state jurisdictions. Id.
19. See id. at 409 ("In the reverse auction, a defendant faced with multiple filings will
often separately negotiate with the different class counsel at the same time to encourage
counsel to underbid one another with the defendant's promise of an agreed certification
as part of a settlement that is good for the defendant, profitable for the lowest bidding
class counsel and less lucrative for the class members."); see also the litigation surrounding
Matsushita Electric Indusustrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 378 (1996) (holding that a Dela-
ware state court decision approving a settlement had a preclusive effect in federal courts).
20. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 20-21 (2005); Underwood, supra note 15, at 403-04
(describing this phenomenon as plaintiffs using the threat of devastating class judgments
to force the defendant to settle).
21. When a court does not properly oversee a settlement, plaintiff and defense coun-
sel may collude and leave the plaintiff with a poor settlement. See Underwood, supra note
15, at 427-29. Even in the absence of collusion, too often state courts approve class action
settlements that are extremely lucrative to the class counsel by way of attorneys' fees, but
provide little to no benefit to the class members. S. REp. No. 109-14, at 14-20.
22. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10-23.
23. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12
(2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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ants are not states, state officials, or other government entities against
whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief; and
(4) any class member is either (a) a citizen of a different state from
any defendant, (b) a foreign citizen and a defendant is a citizen of a
state, or (c) a citizen of a state and any defendant is a foreign citizen. 24
If the class action meets these requirements, the defendant may re-
move the case from state to federal court under CAFA.2 5
C. CAFA Enables Defendants to Remove Nearly All Multi-State
Diversity Class Actions Filed in State Courts to Federal
Court
Prior to CAFA, defendants were unable to remove multi-state di-
versity class actions to federal court if the plaintiff chose a non-diverse
class representative to defeat diversity.26 Additionally, in actions in
which each class member's damages were less than $75,000, the claims
could not be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy require-
ment.27 Another obstacle to removal was that all defendants had to
join in the notice of removal. 28 Plaintiffs merely had to join a local
defendant or a defendant unlikely to join in the notice for removal to
avoid federal jurisdiction.
CAFA modifies the law regarding removal in three important
ways. 29 First, any defendant can remove a class action and no longer
needs the consent of all defendants. 30 Second, a class action may be
removed even if a defendant is a citizen of the forum state. 31 Finally,
the former rule that an action may not be removed on the basis of
diversity more than one year after commencement of the action,3 2 no
longer applies to removal of class actions.3 3
24. See id.
25. See Scott L. Nelson, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: An Analysis, 2005 A.B.A.
SEC. LITIG. 5.
26. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10 (2005); Underwood, supra note 15, at 407 (2004).
27. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10-11 (2005); Underwood, supra note 15, at 407 (2004).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
29. See Class Action Fairness Act, § 5, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 12 (2005). Con-
gress amended existing removal law by adding a new section, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, specifically
concerned with the removal of class actions. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
33. Class Action Fairness Act § 5.
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D. Although CAFA Provides Some Mandatory and Discretionary
Restrictions on Federal Jurisdiction over Class Actions, It Will
Nonetheless Force Most Multi-State Diversity Class Actions into
Federal Court
CAFA imposes two mandatory restrictions and suggests federal
judges exercise discretion in allowing the transfer of the class action
from state to federal court. The first mandatory restriction requires
the district court to decline jurisdiction if more than two-thirds of the
class members are citizens of the state in which the action was origi-
nally filed and the following conditions are met: (1) the principal inju-
ries resulting from the alleged conduct of each defendant were
incurred in the state where the action was originally filed; (2) no
other similar class actions have been filed during the preceding three
years; and (3) there is at least one in-state defendant from whom sig-
nificant relief is sought and whose conduct forms a significant basis of
the plaintiffs' claims.3 4
The second mandatory restriction requires a federal court to de-
cline jurisdiction if two-thirds or more of the class members and all
"the primary defendants" are citizens of the state in which the action
was originally filed. 35 The two mandatory restrictions effectively limit
class actions heard in state court to those "where the great majority of
the class and one or more significant defendants are citizens of the
forum state."36
A third limit imposed by CAFA is discretionary. The district court
may choose to decline jurisdiction when between one-third and two-
thirds of the class members and "the primary defendants" share state
citizenship. 37 CAFA enumerates several factors to assist the judge in
determining whether to, in the interest of justice, deny jurisdiction. 38
Thus, a federal court not only has discretion to decline jurisdiction
where a large number of plaintiffs share state citizenship with the pri-
mary defendants, but it also has statutory guidelines for exercising
34. Id. § 4.
35. Id.
36. Nelson, supra note 25, at 6.
37. Class Action Fairness Act § 4.
38. Id. These factors include whether the claims involve matters of national or inter-
state interest, involve the application of the law of states other than the forum state, derive
from class actions pleaded in a manner that seek to avoid federal jurisdiction, represent a
distinct nexus between the case and the forum state, present an imbalance with class mem-
bers residing in the forum state being a substantial majority as compared with residents of
other states, and whether the action simulates other class actions brought before the courts
within the past three years. See id.
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that discretion, based on the relationship of the action to the forum
state. 39
Although the mandatory and discretionary provisions place some
class actions back in state court, they have little impact on CAFA's
overall effect-rerouting almost all multi-state class actions from state
to federal court.40 Apart from cases "where a class is defined to in-
clude only citizens of a particular state, there may be [only a] few
cases where class members will be so concentrated in individual states
that the two-thirds requirement could be met."41 Furthermore, in
cases where the restrictive provision potentially applies, it may be diffi-
cult to determine at the outset if the provision applies, spawning satel-
lite litigation over the number of class members who are forum state
residents.42
CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction and the elimination of
restriction on removal make it likely that, as a practical matter, the
only classes remaining in state court are those that are limited to state
domiciliaries and at least one principal defendant who is also a domi-
ciliary. Consequently, the majority of multi-state class actions will be
initially filed in, or immediately removed to, federal court. Once in
federal court, there may be other class actions, consolidated cases, or
individual lawsuits arising out of the same legal and factual basis as the
action proposed for certification. 43 These cases may cause conflicts if
they purport to bind overlapping or duplicative actions. 44 In federal
courts, multiple cases based on the same product or occurrence may
be transferred to a single federal district under the MDL procedure of
28 U.S.C. § 1407.
39. See id.
40. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 84-85 (2005); id. at 92 ("[T]he effect of the class action
provisions of [CAFA] would be to move virtually all class action litigation into the Federal
courts .... ); Nelson, supra note 25, at 13 ("[W]e can expect to see defendants vigorously
exercise the removal provisions . . ").
41. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 7.
42. Id.
43. The district judge "should direct counsel to identify the names of all similar cases
in other courts, their stage of pretrial preparation, and the assigned judges." MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.312 (2004).
44. Id. § 21.15.
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E. Related Cases Pending in Federal Courts May Be Consolidated
in a Single District Where a Federal Judge May Have to Decide
Whether a Class Action Goverened by Multiple State Laws Can
Be Properly Certified for Class Treatment
To avoid inconsistent rulings and minimize duplicative discov-
ery,4 5 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel") has
authority to transfer related federal cases to one district court for con-
solidated pretrial proceedings. 4 6 It is advisable that district courts de-
lay certification of class actions if transfer is likely. 47 If certification is
granted prior to transfer, however, the transferee court may decertify
the class and start afresh with the certification analysis. 48 Therefore,
after the cases are multidistricted, a single federal judge will deter-
mine whether an action is suitable for class treatment.
Before ruling on certification, the MDL court hearing the trans-
ferred case arising under state law must determine what law applies to
the cases. The Erie49 doctrine requires a federal court exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction to apply the law of the state in which the federal court
sits, as opposed to some artificial construct such as "federal general
common law." 50 Further, the Erie doctrine binds a federal district
court sitting in diversity to the choice-of-law methodology of the state
in which it sits.5 1 Cases that have been multidistricted bring with them
the law of the state from which they were transferred. 52 They are not
adjudicated under the law of the transferee court.53 To determine
what law applies to a class action that has been transferred pursuant to
45. Id.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000). Although consolidation under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is
for pretrial purposes only, prior to Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach,
523 U.S. 26 (1988), MDL courts frequently kept the case in their court for trial pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 552-53. Since Lexecon, however, self-transfer
for trial is not permitted under Rule 1407. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40-41.
47. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.15 (2004) ("If transfer to a MDL
proceeding is likely, it is usually best to defer certification until the MDL Panel acts .... A
delay in deciding certification might also be appropriate if other cases in state or federal
court are at a more advanced stage in the litigation.") Id.
48. See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 496 (J.P.M.L. 1968). With re-
gard to the class action determinations made by a transferor court prior to transfer, the
transferee court "may determine class action questions and review and revise any class ac-
tion order as in its sound judicial discretion is desirable or necessary in interests ofjustice."
Id. at 496.
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50. Id. at 78.
51. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
52. See id.
53. See id.
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MDL, a transferee court must look to the state from which the action
was transferred and apply that state's choice-of-law rules.
54
Where plaintiffs are residents of the forum in which the action
was originally filed, and where the claims arise from transactions that
occurred in that forum, the choice-of-law rules of most states will ap-
ply the law of the forum-the plaintiffs' domicile. 55 Accordingly, the
MDLjudge to whom such cases are transferred will, in most instances,
be required to apply the law of each individual class member's domi-
cile to each individual class member's claims.
56
II. Federal Courts Routinely Deny Certification of Multi-
State Diversity Class Actions Because They Require
Application of Multiple States' Laws
Since Amchem, the obstacle to satisfying Rule 23(b) (3)'s twin re-
quirements of predominance and superiority has been the need to
apply the law of multiple jurisdictions.57 Most discussions on choice-
of-law in multi-state diversity class actions begin with Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts,58 in which the Supreme Court held that application of a
single state's law to a nationwide plaintiff class, when 97% of the plain-
tiffs had no apparent connection to that state, was a violation of due
process.5 9 It was, however, the Court's approval of the Third Circuit's
54. Generally, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rule of
the state in which it sits. Under Van Dusen, when cases are transferred from one district to
another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, and jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,
the transferee court must apply the law of the transferor court. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 637-40 (1964). As the court in DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 745 F. Supp. 79,
81 (D.P.R. 1990), noted, "[t]his same principle has been traditionally followed without
much explanation in [diversity] cases consolidated by the Multidistrict Panel pursuant to
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1407." (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May
25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981); In reAir Crash Disaster at Wash. D.C. on Jan. 13,
1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983)).
55. Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide
Class Actions, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 835, 841 (2000).
56. Id.
57. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that class action is never proper when the laws of multiple states
must be applied); Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying
certification of nationwide class because the laws of multiple states would have to be ap-
plied.); In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying certifica-
tion of a nationwide class action because the district judge failed to consider how the law of
negligence differs through the jurisdictions); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
741 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying certification of a nationwide diversity class action because the
need to apply each state's tort and fraud laws defeated predominance and manageability).
58. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
59. Id. at 815, 823.
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opinion twelve years later in Amchem that contained the language, al-
beit dicta, that provided federal courts with the ammunition necessary
to deny certification on the grounds that the application of the laws of
multiple states renders a class action unmanageable. The Third Cir-
cuit stated:
[B]ecause we must apply an individualized choice of law analysis to
each plaintiffs claims ... the proliferation of disparate factual and
legal issues is compounded exponentially. The states have different
rules governing the whole range of issues raised by the plaintiffs'
claims: viability of futures claims; availability of causes of action
... ; causation; the type of proof necessary to prove asbestos expo-
sure; statutes of limitations; joint and several liability; and compara-
tive/contributory negligence. 60
During its discussion on predominance, the Supreme Court ap-
provingly noted the Third Circuit's conclusion on this point stating,
"Differences in state law ... compound these disparities. '61
The Amchem decision arose out of the asbestos litigation that be-
gan to flood the courts in the 1970s. 62 In 1991, the MDL Panel trans-
ferred all asbestos cases pending in federal district courts throughout
the country-some 30,000 cases at that time-to a single district, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 63
After consolidation, attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants formed
separate steering committees and began settlement negotiations. 64 Al-
though the MDL Panel's order collected, transferred, and consoli-
dated only pending federal court cases, settlement negotiations
included efforts to find a means of resolving future cases.65 The first
round of settlement negotiations fell apart; the second round resulted
in the filing of the case that ultimately became Amchem. 66 Plaintiffs
initially filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the asbestos MDL
court, on behalf of a nationwide class of persons who had not yet filed
suit based on any asbestos injury, but who might file such a claim in
the future against any of the asbestos defendants named in the suit.67
The parties never intended to litigate this new class action. 68 Instead,
60. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
61. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624.
62. Id. at 597-98.
63. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418, 422-24
(J.P.M.L. 1991).
64. Id. at 422, 424.
65. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 601.
68. Id.
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the parties filed for the sole purpose of obtaining certification of a
class of future claimants on whose behalf a settlement already negoti-
ated could then be entered into.69 It was a "future only" "settlement
only" class action. 70
Within a single day the parties presented the district court with a
complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement, and a joint motion for
conditional class certification. 7 1 The proposed class consisted of po-
tentially hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals who
had been exposed to asbestos. 72 The complaint delineated no sub-
classes. 73 The district court certified the class and approved the pro-
posed settlement.74 The Third Circuit reversed on several grounds.
One reason in particular was that the predominance and manageabil-
ity requirements were not satisfied due to the need to apply the law of
fifty states.7 5 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the Third Circuit, va-
cated the judgment and remanded. 76
The Supreme Court held that in order to be certified a settle-
ment class must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) 77 and (b), even
though the parties do not intend to try the case. 78 The Court refused
to certify the class because, inter alia, the laws of multiple states would
have to be applied. 79 Although the Court limited its holding to "settle-
ment only" class actions, it warned that variations in state law could
69. Id. at 601-02.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The class comprised all persons who had not previously sued any of the asbestos
manufacturing companies that are petitioners to the suit, "but who (1) had been ex-
posed-occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a spouse or household
member-to asbestos or products containing asbestos attributable to a ... [petitioner], or
(2) whose spouse or family member had been so exposed." Id. at 602.
73. Id. at 603.
74. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
75. Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub
nom. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
76. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-25, 641.
77. Rule 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are question of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class.
FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
78. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-22. The Court noted, however, that a settlement-only
class action need not be manageable under the superiority requirement in Rule 23(b) (3)
because the proposal is that the case will not go to trial. Id. at 620.
79. Id. at 622-24.
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defeat predominance and render the class unmanageable. 80 When
the laws of fifty states are implicated in a class action, "differences in
state law will 'compound the disparities' among class members from
the different states."81
Although Amchem does not categorically preclude certification of
multi-state class actions, since Amchem, federal courts have rarely certi-
fied class actions involving the laws of multiple states. 82 If the laws of
each plaintiff's state must be applied to each plaintiff, federal judges
will typically dismiss the case, reasoning that the case is simply unman-
ageable because common questions do not predominate. 83 As the
Senate Report accompanying CAFA indicates, "six circuit courts and
twenty-six district courts have consistently denied certification of
multi-state consumer cases."8 4 The United States Chamber of Com-
merce has also recognized this, stating: "Federal courts have consist-
ently refused to certify nationwide class actions in product defect cases
because the need to apply the laws of many different states would
make such a sprawling class action unmanageable. "85 It is such an ac-
cepted practice in federal courts to deny certification of multi-state
class actions that the Senate Report contains a plea from the dissent-
ing Senators to amend CAFA to "ensure that cases which are removed
from state courts are at least not immediately dismissed by the Federal
judge on choice of law grounds."86 Opponents of CAFA argue that it,
in conjunction with Amchem, may spell the end of nationwide class
actions based on state law because it will effectively prevent both state
and federal courts from hearing any nationwide or multi-state class
action.8 7
80. See id.; see also 7AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1780.1 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that predominance and superiority inquiries are inexo-
rably intertwined with respect to choice-of-law issues such that application of multiple state
laws to a single consolidated proceeding is capable of both defeating predominance and
rendering the class unmanageable).
81. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 340
(D.N.J. 1997) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24).
82. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 86 (2005).
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id. at 86.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 85-87.
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III. The Combination of CAFA and Amchem Results in
Negative Consequences for Plaintiffs and
Defendants
After Amchem, plaintiffs sought certification of multi-state and na-
tionwide class actions in state court in an effort to avoid the roadblock
to certification they faced in federal courts.88 Prior to CAFA, the pro-
ponent of certification could name a class representative that shared a
common citizenship with any defendant,89 or limit individual class
member claims to an amount less than $75,000.90 CAFA has elimi-
nated these loopholes by removing the complete diversity require-
ment and the rule against aggregating claims to satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement, and by lessening the removal requirements
for defendants. 91 Since CAFA, it is practically impossible for plaintiffs
in a class action to avoid federal jurisdiction.
While it is too soon to gauge the effects of CAFA, it seems likely
that class action plaintiffs' lawyers may begin to file multiple statewide
class actions-i.e., file multiple suits with each one limited to the re-
sidents of a single state, in order to avoid the problems of multi-state
classes. An unsettling result may be that plaintiffs' counsel will only
file multiple statewide class actions on behalf of residents of the most
populous states, so that the damages will be sufficient to support the
litigation. Since one-half of the population can be gathered in about
nine states,92 the concern is that the less populous states will be left
out. For defendants, an unforeseen consequence may be that they are
faced with multiple class actions, in various locations, possibly result-
ing in conflicting judgments.
88. Feldman, supra note 6, at 231 ("Given federal court hostility to certification of
non-federal question class actions, plaintiffs have proceeded to file a larger percentage of
these putative class claims in state court.").
89. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10; Underwood, supra note 15, at 434-35.
90. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10-11; Underwood, supra note 15, at 435.
91. Nelson, supra note 25, at 2.
92. United States Census Bureau, Census 2000, Ranking of Tables for States: 1990 and
2000, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t2/tabOl.txt (last visited Apr. 18,
2006) (Table PHC-T-2).
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IV. District Courts Can Certify Certain Multi-State Diversity
Class Actions if They Are Willing to Conduct the
Necessary Analyses and Use the Tools Available
to Them
In Bridgestone/Firestone, the Seventh Circuit decertified two nation-
wide class actions because the claims required adjudication under the
law of many jurisdictions and was therefore unmanageable under
Rule 23(b) (3) .93 The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion without
undertaking any sort of comparative state law analysis to determine if
application was in fact unmanageable.
In the late 1990s, certain Firestone tires and Ford Explorer SUVs
contained defects resulting in injuries and deaths. 94 As a result many
lawsuits were filed. 95 Persons whose Firestone tires or Explorers had
yet to malfunction filed suit for the risk of failure reflected in the di-
minished resell value. 96 The MDL Panel transferred these suits filed
in, or removed to, federal court to the Southern District of Indiana in
October of 2000. 97 Shortly after the plaintiffs filed a motion for certifi-
cation under Rule 23(b) (3).98 In December of 2001 Judge Barker
granted certification of two nationwide class actions: a Tire Class rep-
resenting owners and lessees of various Firestone tires, and an Ex-
plorer class representing owners and lessees of various Ford Explorer
models. 99
The Seventh Circuit, expressing its blanket opposition to multi-
state diversity class actions, stated that "[n] o class action is proper un-
less all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Otherwise the
class cannot satisfy the commonality and superiority requirements of
[Rule 23] (b) (3)."100 In its independent analysis, the court determined
that the class claims were governed by the laws of fifty states, the Dis-
93. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012,1018-21
(7th Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 1014.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1015.
97. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 509
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
98. Id.
99. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, 205 F.R.D. at
503).
100. Id. The Seventh Circuit's hostility towards multi-state class actions is not unique to
the Bridgestone/Firestone case. The Seventh Circuit routinely denies certification of multi-
state diversity suits based on mass torts, warranty, fraud, and products liability. See, e.g., In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d
679 (7th Cir. 2001); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
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trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. 101 Without conducting an
analysis into whether the applicable state laws varied significantly on
the substantive issues as to render the class unmanageable, the court
concluded that this class action and all multi-state diversity class ac-
tions are per se unmanageable. 10 2
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, class actions can be
properly certified under Rule 23(b) (3) even when the litigants are
governed by more than one legal rule. The manageability analysis
under Rule 23(b) (3) can be divided into four steps. First, determine if
the substantive law of more than one state is implicated, and if so,
determine which law governs each claim. Second, identify the substan-
tive, or primary, issues likely to be disputed in the case. Third, com-
pare the laws of each relevant jurisdiction on the substantive issues.
Fourth, if the comparison reveals variations in law, develop a trial plan
that deals with the variations in a manageable fashion.
A. Step One: The Court Must Determine Whether the Laws of
More Than One State Are Involved, However, the Court
Need Not Distort the Choice-of-Law Analysis to
Facilitate Certification
The manageability analysis begins with the determination of
whether the case implicates the laws of more than one jurisdiction. If
a multi-state diversity action involves a uniform nationwide contract
with a choice-of-law clause, providing that the law of a single state ap-
plies, the clause is usually enforced. 103 If there is no uniform choice-
of-law provision, 104 it is almost certain that, with respect to events or
transactions taking place in each class member's state of residence,
the law of each class member's state of residence will apply to each
class member's claims. 10 5 Where class actions are filed on behalf of
101. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016.
102. Id. at 1018.
103. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830, 833 (Wash. 1978).
104. Although choice-of-law provisions can eliminate this issue with respect to contract
claims, "tort claims are usually not covered by such agreements .... [A]s long as multistate
tort class actions continue to be filed, the choice-of-law analysis will remain relevant to
certification." Jeremy T. Grabill, Comment, Multistate Class Actions Properly Frustrated by
Choice-of-Law Complexities: The Role of Parallel Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REv. 299, 304
(2005).
105. Phair, supra note 55, at 840 ("Since most of the [choice-of-law] methodologies
consider a state to have a significant interest in protecting its citizens and in regulating
activities within its own boundaries, they place a heavy emphasis on the plaintiffs domicile
as the relevant factor in determining the applicable law. In a nationwide Rule 23(b) (3)
class action, which includes domiciliaries of each of the fifty states, a district court is con-
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residents of more than one state, or where a number of related state-
wide class actions are multi-districted, it is a foregone conclusion that
the laws of the plaintiffs' residences will be implicated-whether the
class involves fifteen or fifty states' laws. 106
In Bridgestone/Firestone, Judge Barker, persuaded by plaintiffs' ar-
gument, concluded that Illinois's choice-of-law rule, lex loci delicti, dic-
tated that the law of a single state, rather than each claimant's
resident state, applied to each class action.10 7 According to the Sev-
enth Circuit, the district judge chose this route for fear that the appli-
cation of multiple states' laws would prevent certification.' 08 The
connection between choice-of-law and satisfaction of Rule 23(b) (3)'s
manageability requirement is obvious and presents a formidable ob-
stacle to certification, especially in the Seventh Circuit.10 9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' and the
district court's choice-of-law analysis, concluding that, "in all but ex-
ceptional cases [the lex loci delicti approach] applies the law of the
place where harm occurred." 110 Since the harm in this case was finan-
cial loss, the locus of that harm was where the vehicles and tires were
purchased and resold, which occurred in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. 11
Distorting choice-of-law rules, as Judge Barker did, in an effort to
simplify complex litigation is a common practice in federal court, es-
pecially in MDL cases." 2 However, a district court need not violate
states' choice-of-law principles to properly certify a multi-state class ac-
tion. Even if the court concludes that the laws of each plaintiff's state
of residence must be applied, it does not necessarily follow that class
certification must be denied. This is only the first step in a proper
fronted with a scenario in which each state may have a significant interest in protecting its
own citizens and ensuring compensation for the injuries suffered by them.").
106. Steven P. Zabel & Jeffrey A. Eyres, Conflict-of-Law Issues in Multistate Product Liability
Class Actions, 19 HAMLINE L. REv. 429, 429 ("Under the Erie doctrine and the choice-of-law
rules of most states, the individual claims of each class member will be governed by the law
of the state in which the class member is domiciled.").
107. Judge Barker concluded that the law of Michigan applied to the Explorer class
and the law of Tennessee applied to the Tire class. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires
Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082-83 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
108. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015 ("No class action is proper unless all liti-
gants are governed by the same legal rules.... The district judge, well aware of this princi-
ple, recognized that uniform law would be essential to class certification." ).
109. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
110. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016.
111. Id.
112. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 547-61 (conducting a thorough analysis of the trend
in federal courts to distort choice-of-law analysis).
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inquiry as to whether the need to apply the law of multiple jurisdic-
tions defeats manageability. Once "a trial court determines that class
claims will require adjudication under the laws of multiple states, the
court must then ascertain [the extent to which] variations exist among
the applicable laws [relating to the issues actually in dispute]. '' 1 3
B. Step Two: The Court Must Determine the Core Issues Likely to
Be in Substantial Dispute at Trial
The initial pleadings filed in class action cases often create the
impression that the case is more complicated than it actually is. Plain-
tiffs routinely "assert every conceivable claim arising from a set of
facts," and "defendants often assert numerous inapplicable affirmative
defenses in an answer to a complaint."'1 4 However, the pretrial pro-
cess and focused discovery will make it possible to identify a much
smaller set of core issues substantially in dispute. 115 The parties can
often eliminate issues by stipulation or by concession. 116 Moreover,
the pretrial process in federal court provides numerous tools for a
judge to make complex cases "manageable" by eliminating marginal
claims and defenses and forcing the parties to concentrate on the
core issues substantially in dispute-provided the judge is willing to
use these tools fairly aggressively. 117
A task essential to the evaluation of a 23(b) (3) class action's man-
ageability is the reduction of legal issues and sub-issues to manageable
proportions. 18 The court can reduce the complexity of a case by us-
ing the pre-trial process to eliminate minor issues and compel the par-
ties to concentrate on the handful of major issues that constitute the
heart of the case.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was designed to encourage
judicial control during the pretrial process" a9 and bestows on courts a
broad range of power in an effort to improve planning and manage-
ment. 20 The court may order the parties to participate in mandatory
113. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1082 (Cal. 2001).
114. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcriONs 316 (2002) [here-
inafter NEWBERG).
115. Kramer, supra note 12, at 582-83.
116. Id.
117. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 16(c) (1); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.33
(2004).
118. Phair, supra note 55, at 853.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (1) advisory committee's notes ("Increased judicial control
during the pretrial process accelerates the processing and termination of cases.").
120. Id. Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an
early state the case is "disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less cost
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meetings in which counsel must decide the issues on which they agree
and those that are in contention.121
If the parties fail to reduce the issues to a manageable number,
the court may be able to isolate and grant certification with respect to
core issues only under Rule 23(c) (4) (A).1 22 To facilitate certification,
the court can defer dealing with management concerns surrounding
the severed issues until the class action portion of the trial is com-
plete. 123 Although questions exist as to the constitutionality of issue
severance and partial certification, 124 Rule 23(c) (4) (A) may prove to
be a useful tool capable of facilitating certification when the issues in
contention are too numerous as to make the case unmanageable as a
class action.
For example, in Bridgestone/Firestone, the Master Complaint filed
on January 2, 2001, contained fourteen causes of action.1 25 Actually
litigating fourteen causes of action in a nationwide class action based
on state law would most likely be impossible to manage. By the time
the trial court granted certification, however, on December 31, 2001,
merely three theories of relief from the Master Complaint had sur-
vived-consumer fraud, breach of express and implied warranty, and
unjust enrichment. 26
Once the relevant jurisdictions and the substantive issues in dis-
pute are identified, the court must analyze whether there are any sig-
and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices." Id. The advisory committee's
notes also indicate that the intention of Rule 16 is to encourage better planning and man-
agement in the pretrial process and that increased judicial control facilitates these goals.
Id.
121. See NEWBERG, supra note 114, at 317.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) (A) (stating when appropriate an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues).
123. NEWBERG, supra note 114, at 446-47, 449.
124. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995) (questioning
whether certifying a class with respect to particular issues only under Rule. 23(c) (4) (A)
violated litigants Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury).
125. The Master Complaint alleged the following causes of action: violation of
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1); violation of civil RICO, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a), asserted on behalf of the Tire Class and Explorer Class; violation of civil RICO,
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), asserted on behalf of the Tire Class and Explorer Class; violation of
Civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), asserted on behalf of the Tire Class and Explorer Class;
declaratory judgment/equitable and injunctive relief; restitution/disgorgement for unjust
enrichment; violation of all states' consumer protection statutes; breach of express war-
ranty; breach of implied warranty; negligence; breach of warranty against rehibitory defects
under Louisiana law. See Master Complaint at 56-82, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-9373 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/default.htm.
126. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 520
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
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nificant differences in the law of each jurisdiction on each substantive
issue.
C. Step Three: Conduct a State-by-State Comparative Analysis of
the Law Governing the Core Issues Substantially in
Dispute, Which Will Frequently Reveal Relative
Uniformity Among the Jurisdictions
Judge Posner opined that "before entangling itself in messy issues
of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a
difference between the relevant laws of the different states." 127 If the
relevant jurisdictions are in virtual agreement on an issue, meaning
minor variations do not affect the outcome, then manageability will
not be an issue. 128
When the laws of multiple states are implicated, proponents of
class certification have the burden of establishing that, despite the ap-
plicability of multiple states' laws, the class action satisfies Rule
23(b) (3)'s manageability requirement.1 29 This analysis is difficult, but
not impossible and given the relative uniformity of the laws of the
states, it is likely that no more than three or four different formula-
tions will govern each substantive issue.' 30
Since the proponent of class certification carries the burden, any
plaintiffs' counsel representing a multi-state diversity class should be
capable of conducting a state-by-state survey and comparison of the
relevant law on the substantive issues. It has been suggested that class
127. Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Can. Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1992).
128. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 n.20 (1985).
129. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 2004) (In a
Rule 23(b) (3) class action, "[t]he plaintiffs have the burden of showing that common ques-
tions of law predominate, and they cannot meet this burden when the various laws have
not been identified and compared."); Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that common
questions of law predominate because they did not present sufficient choice-of-law analysis,
including a sub-class plan in case the court found that multiple states' laws applied); In re
Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 208 (D. Minn. 2003) ("The Court has not received
from Plaintiffs a thorough analysis of the differences in state law, nor suggestions as to how
the state laws can be divided into subclasses."); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d
1071, 1082 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the party seeking class certification bears the burden
of demonstrating, by detailed analysis of the laws of the various states, that complexity does
not make a multi-state class unsuitable).
130. Kramer, supra note 12, at 582 ("States tend to copy their laws from each other,
and may use identical or virtually identical rules. In practice, the court will seldom have to
deal with more than three or four formulations, and the choice will often be between two
alternatives.").
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counsel's ability to provide such an analysis should be part of Rule
23(a)'s adequacy of representation inquiry.' 3'
A state-by-state survey of the law is the most difficult part of the
manageability analysis, but complex litigation does not become un-
manageable simply because it is necessary to conduct this survey, even
if it is nationwide in scope. 132 The process is aided by a number of
sources. Research databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw expedite
the process significantly. Additionally, since class action attorneys
"tend to be repeat players," class counsel may look to others in their
field, or within their own firm for comparable surveys to use as a start-
ing point. 133
Once the proponents and opponents of class certification have
briefed the relevant laws, 134 the trial court must examine the results to
ensure they are not "skewed by adversarial bias."'135 Some commenta-
tors assert that the task of ascertaining the laws of many states is itself
an unmanageably difficult task for a district court.13 6 However, courts
have tools available to help them compare the relevant law accurately
and efficiently. Aided by the growing body of independent compara-
tive multi-state analyses, 137 courts can cross-reference the analyses
presented by the parties rather than conduct their own entirely from
scratch. If the law of a particular jurisdiction is difficult to ascertain, 138
one possible, although somewhat extreme, solution is to certify the
question to the Supreme Court of that state under the Uniform Certi-
131. See Phair, supra note 55, at 857 n.104.
132. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 584.
133. Phair, supra note 55, at 857.
134. Although plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating manageability, the defen-
dant normally provides an analysis to argue that certification is improper due to the sub-
stantial variations in state law on the core issues in the case.
135. Phair, supra note 55, at 857.
136. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class
Actions After Phillips v. Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1986). As Miller and
Crump state, "In order to group the states, the court initially must make decisions about
the meanings of the laws of each." Id. Miller and Crump analogize the task of deciding the
meanings of the laws of each state to "a first-year law student who, instead of a course in
contracts, is required simultaneously to enroll in fifty courses, each covering the contract
law of a single state, and to apply each body of law correctly on the final examination." Id.
137. Phair, supra note 55, at 857.
138. Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REv.
718, 742 (1979). The author argues that choice-of-law may present the danger of an
unwarranted intrusion into another state's legal affairs through a mistaken appli-
cation of its laws. The court should thus consider its own familiarity with the other
state's law, the degree to which that law is unclear or unsettled, and the extent to
which it implicates important interests of the other state.
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fication of Questions of Law Act of 1967.139 The bottom line is that
district courts are charged with adjudicating diversity cases and diver-
sity cases often require the application of foreign law. 140 The difficulty
in determining a foreign state's law on a particular issue should be the
same whether the court is required to determine the law of a single
state in ten different cases or to determine the law of ten states in a
single case.
Although Judge Barker in Bridgestone/Firestone elected to apply the
law of Illinois to a nationwide class, attorneys for plaintiffs and defend-
ants had anticipated the need to apply the law of each claimant's resi-
dence. Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Class
Certification ("Plaintiffs' Brief") puts forth a state-by-state analysis and
comparison on the laws of each relevant jurisdiction as to the class's
state law claims.14 1 Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs' Brief concludes that the
laws in each of these areas are relatively uniform from state-to-state.' 42
For example, the claims for breach of express and implied war-
ranty are primarily governed by section 2-313 and 2-314(1) respec-
tively, of the Uniform Commercial Code143 ("UCC"). The UCC has
been enacted in every American jurisdiction except Louisiana.14 4 Ten
139. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAw AcT § 1 (1990). Although this tool is
infrequently resorted to, the Act is currently adopted in twenty-five states and the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. The Act allows a state court to answer questions of state law
that have been certified to it by any federal court including the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation. Id.
140. Under Erie, every time a federal court hears a diversity action it must determine
and apply the law of the state in which it sits. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). Likewise, under Van Dusen, a federal court, hearing a case transferred under FED.
R. Civ. P. 1407, must determine and apply the law of each state from which a case was
transferred. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 625 (1964). Therefore, the analysis should
not be foreign to district judges.
141. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 24-46,
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX 1I, and Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 00-9373 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/
default.htm [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief]. Class counsel attached as exhibits to their brief
detailed analyses and comparisons of each state's laws on each substantive issue and graph-
ically illustrated for the court the variations in state law. These exhibits are unavailable
online.
142. Id. at 44-45. Notably, the plaintiffs' conclusion that relative uniformity among
state law exists comports with what Professor Kramer's hypothesis postulated several years
earlier. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 583. Kramer predicted
there will never be fifty different substantive rules, or even fifteen or ten. States
tend to copy their laws from each other, and may use identical or virtually identi-
cal rules. In practice, the court will seldom have to deal with more than three or
four formulations and the choice will often be between two alternatives.
Id.
143. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 141, at 30, 34.
144. Id.
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states add a reliance element to the express warranty claim. 145 Certain
states require privity to recover for economic loss from breach of an
implied warranty. Lastly, all states that follow the UCC have adopted
section 2-714(2) to determine the measure of damages for breach of
warranty claim. 146
Equally foreseeable, defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification ("Defendants' Brief") found
numerous material variations, state-to-state. 147 Defendants' analysis of
express and implied warranty naturally resulted in different conclu-
sions. They agreed that the UCC has been adopted in every state ex-
cept Louisiana; however, they cite to case law and various secondary
references to support their assertion that the UCC is not uniform. 148
Found nowhere in the opinions of the district court or the Sev-
enth Circuit is an examination of the parties' briefs on this issue, nor
is there an explicit determination of whether the laws regarding the
core issues in dispute in Bridgestone/Firestone contained too many sub-
stantial variations as to render the class unmanageable.
The need to apply various states' laws to a class action does not
make it per se unmanageable. 149 Class counsel should provide the
court with a detailed trial plan demonstrating how state law variances
can be dealt with by way of subclasses.150
145. Id. at 32.
146. Id. at 36.
147. See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certi-
fication, at 11-17, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness Tires
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-9373 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://www.insd.us
courts.gov/Firestone/default.htm. Like class counsel, defendants' counsel attached as ex-
hibits to their brief detailed analyses and comparisons of each state's laws on each substan-
tive issue and graphically illustrated for the court the variations in state law. Unfortunately,
these exhibits, like plaintiffs' exhibits, are unavailable online.
148. Id. at 15. In support of the proposition that the UCC is not uniform, the defend-
ants cited to Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d. 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Osborne v. Subaru of
America, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Ct. App. 1988); E. Hunter Taylor,Jr., Uniformity of Commer-
cial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337
(1978); E. Hunter Taylor,Jr., Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527
(1980).
149. See Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1082 (Cal. 2001).
150. Id.
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D. Step Four: Once the Issues Are Defined and the Applicable
Law Is Ascertained, Federal District Courts Can Use
Several Tools to Manage Class Claims that May
Initially Seem Unmanageable
By their nature complex cases are difficult to litigate. 51 Neverthe-
less, federal courts are well equipped with procedures and litigation
devices to adjudicate multi-state diversity actions, without violating
Rule 23(b) (3).152
"[C] ertification of a nationwide class in which the law of the 50
states, rather than federal law, must be identified and applied, places
the burden upon plaintiffs to 'credibly demonstrate through an "ex-
tensive analysis" of state law variances, "that class certification does not
present insuperable obstacles."' .153 Class counsel should submit to
the court a "blueprint for trial,"1 54 consisting of a proposal for sub-
classes with separate class representatives, sample jury instructions,
and special verdicts.
1. Courts Can Manage Variations in the Law Through the Creation
of Subclasses
The state-by-state analysis supplied by plaintiffs' counsel in Bridge-
stone/Firestone argued that merely a few variations in state law existed as
to each substantive issue. These variations fell into a few, clearly de-
fined categories. 155 The categories outlined class counsel's proposal
for subclasses. 156
For instance, Louisiana is the only state that does not follow the
UCC with respect to breach of express and implied warranty. 157
Therefore, a subclass could have been created to account for this
clearly defined variation. The ten states that add a reliance element to
express warranty claims would have neatly fit into their own subclass.
In addition, class members from those states requiring privity for
breach of implied warranty who failed to meet this requirement at
151. Bough & Bough, supra note 10, at 26.
152. NEWBERG, supra note 114, at 463.
153. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 340
(D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
154. Id. at 356.
155. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 141, at 18.
156. For discussion of the variations in states' laws and corresponding subclasses as to
breach of express warranty claims, see id. at 32-34. For discussion of the variations in
states' laws and corresponding subclasses as to breach of implied warranty of
merchantability and damages for breach of warranty, see id. at 34-37.
157. Id. at 30, 34.
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trial simply would not have recovered damages if damages were
awarded for this claim. 158
Each subclass must independently satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23(a).159 Rule 23(a), detailing the prerequisites to class certifica-
tion, requires that the "claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class."'160 When a class is
divided according to differences in state law, the claims and defenses
of each subclass will vary accordingly. To facilitate certification, sepa-
rate representatives for each subclass should be appointed to ensure
that the class action satisfies Rule 23(a)'s adequacy of representation
requirement. 161 Had the district court in Bridgestone/Firestone con-
ducted the proper choice-of-law analysis and created subclasses to ac-
count for the variations in law, it would have been prudent to appoint
class representatives to each subclass to avoid conflicts of interest be-
tween the representatives and the unnamed class members.
2. Courts Can Protect the Rights of Parties Litigating Under
Multiple State Laws Through Jury Instructions and
Special Verdicts
Litigating a case governed by multiple laws can be confusing. In a
bench trial the court can keep the factual presentation in a logical
order by adjusting the order of proof as necessary. 162 At the end of
trial, the judge can make written findings to distinguish among sub-
classes. 163 Jury trials, however, present additional challenges. Jurors
may resist making different awards for different groups of plaintiffs
who have suffered the same injuries based on differences in
geography. 164
Had the Bridgestone/Firestone case proceeded as a multi-state class
action, Judge Barker could have required class counsel to provide the
court with a more detailed trial plan. A trial judge has the discretion
to require the proponent of class certification to submit sample jury
instructions and special verdict forms demonstrating how the substan-
158. Id. at 34.
159. See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 118 (E.D. Va. 1980).
160. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(3).
161. Miller & Crump, supra note 136, at 64 ("A court hearing a multistate class action
ordinarily should provide separate representation for subgroups with conflicting
interests.").
162. Kramer, supra note 12, at 585.
163. Id.
164. The judge should instruct the jury as to why the differences in applicable law exist
and the importance of respecting these differences. Id.
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tive theories will be presented to the jury "'in a way that fairly repre-
sents the law of [each jurisdiction] while not overwhelming jurors
with hundreds of interrogatories and a verdict form as large as an
almanac.'" 165
The judge, with the help of counsel, may craft special jury ver-
dicts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a).166 Such ver-
dicts can be tailored to the relevant factual issues of each subclass. 167
A special verdict allows a jury to record findings on specific issues of
fact' 68 and reduces the need for "explanations of legal issues or hypo-
thetical instructions demonstrating how to apply the law to [a given
set of] facts."' 69 The district judge may then take the jury's findings of
fact and apply them to the sub-classes. By simplifying jury instructions,
the special verdict avoids the "impossible task of instructing a jury on
the laws of the fifty states.' 7 0
3. Courts Can Divide Class Actions that Remain Unmanageable
Due to the Numerosity of Issues into a Few Smaller,
More Manageable Class Actions
When adjudication of the issues requires an unduly large number
of subclasses to account for all the variations in law, proceeding as a
single class action is no longer the superior method of disposing of
the claims. "[T]here are limits outside of which the subclassification
system ceases to perform a sufficiently useful function to justify the
maintenance of the class action.''11 l If a nationwide class action is no
longer beneficial, the court should consider dividing the action into
smaller classes, each representing as much of the overall litigation as
possible.1 72
Dividing the action into multiple independent class actions may
not achieve the same economies of scale that a single class action
would, but it is still more cost effective than each claimant bringing an
individual action or fifty statewide class actions. "Regional multi-state
165. Chin v. Chrysler Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448, 458 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting In re Ford
Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 349 (D.N.J. 1997)).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
167. Phair, supra note 55, at 861.
168. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.451 (2004).
169. Phair, supra note 55, at 862 (citing Elizabeth A. Faulkner, Using the Special Verdict to
Manage Complex Cases and Avoid Compromise Verdicts, 21 ARIZ. L.J. 297, 314 (1989)).
170. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.451 (2004).
171. City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 712 n.10 (Cal. 1974).
172. SeeStephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1481 (1987)
(reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985)).
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class actions may be easier to get certified, cheaper to litigate and still
make proper use of scarce judicial resources. 17 3
Conclusion
Multi-state class actions based on state law claims are in danger.
The combination of federal case law and CAFA will likely bar many, if
not most, state law class actions involving more than one state.1 74 Cur-
rently, many federal courts, like the district court and the circuit court
in Bridgestone/Firestone, assume application of multiple states' laws is
per se unmanageable, without endeavoring to find out. Although cer-
tification post-Amchem will undoubtedly require competent class coun-
sel and a courageous judge, if federal courts conduct the requisite
analysis, given the relative uniformity of states' laws and the manage-
ment tools available to them, multi-state class actions can be
manageable.
173. Bough & Bough, supra note 10, at 27.
174. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 94 (2005).
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